

FASCINATING AND DANGEROUS: JAPAN IN KOREA'S ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT IN THE 1900s

VLADIMIR TIKHONOV
OSLO UNIVERSITY

Historical introduction: Meiji Japan and Korean reformists, 1881–1905

Throughout the troubled history of Korea's post-traditional transformation, Japan has served as an important reference point from the very beginnings of Korea's opening to the West up to the present. However diverse the meanings which 'Japan' as a semantic unit could be charged with, it always played the role of an 'essential Other' in almost all post-traditional elite discourses in Korea. A symbol of decay and barbarisation for the conservative Confucians, it became quite the opposite—a model of progress and civilisation—for most of Korea's pro-modern ruling-class progressives, beginning with the masterminds of the aborted 1884 Kapsin *coup d'état*. And a model of sorts it remained: even those progressives who, for various reasons opposed Japan politically, were almost universally supportive and positive so far as the import of Japan's modern institutions was concerned. Pan-Asianism, another important import from Japan, played a role too: it positioned Japan's Other as closer, more intimate, more congenial, than the faraway and culturally and racially heterogeneous primary sources of modernity. The process of creating a modern nation-state and its enlightened ruling classes in Korea can well be described as a kind of dialogue with the Japanese Other. While the language of Korean modernity (first of all, Chinese logographic combinations for translating borrowed Western terms) and its key institutional and ideological structures were consciously learned from the Japanese interlocutor, the latter's colonial ambitions and pejorative views of Korea's ethnicity and history were largely responsible for provoking in the end many influential Korean intellectuals to a nationalist reaction—the creation of a venomously anti-Japanese nationalist ideology, that still remains an important underpinning in the national consciousness of both

North and South Korea. The ‘Korean nation’ created in that dialogue was often defined in distinctively Japanese-sounding terms (“unique homogenous blood lineage”, “possessor of the virtues of loyalty and patriotism”, etc.), while being simultaneously described at the more radical end of the political spectrum as a single unit involved in a mortal combat with its colonial oppressor. As often happens when (post-)colonial nationalisms simultaneously copy and reject the imperial masters, the intensity of anti-Japanese venom was directly proportionate to the intensity of the cultural/institutional borrowing¹. And, concurrent with this, some of the early modern historical figures with rather explicit pro-Japanese sympathies and a known record of political alliances with Japan, such as Kim Okkyun (1851–1894), mastermind of the 1884 Kapsin coup, were continuously hailed as patriots and revolutionaries by political and cultural figures with avowedly anti-Japanese or broader anti-imperialist agendas: Korean *émigré* nationalist leaders of the 1910–20s², North Korea’s official historiographers after the mid-1950s³, or Korean-Japanese and South Korean leftist nationalist historians of the 1960–70s⁴. Anti-Japanese patriots, paradoxically enough, had a tendency to perceive the late 19th-century admirers of Meiji reforms and political allies of Meiji government as their revolutionary and anti-feudal—that is, modernising—predecessors.

The beginnings of the institutional and ideological borrowings can be traced back to the 1881 Courtiers’ Observation Mission to Japan, secretly sent by King Kojong (r. 1863–1907) at the palace’s expense in order to get realistic accounts of the degree of Japan’s success in strengthening itself. The accounts provided by the more radical members of the 12-strong mission (Ŏ Yunjung, 1848–96; Hong Yöngsik, 1855–84) and the moderately conservative members (Sim Sanghak, 1845–?; Cho Pyöngjik, 1833–1901, and others) differed substantially in their final judgement on the value of Japanese reforms, but the points of general agreement rested on the desirability of the limited use of Japanese experience for Korea’s own adjustment to the new times, and the belief that the possibility of Japanese aggression was contingent on Korea’s own reformist efforts. Japan, at this initial point of Korean-Japanese ‘modern dialogue’, was seen as an important reform model—although, as some of the mission members did not fail to mention, plagued by deep social and fiscal problems as well—and hardly any immediate threat to Korea’s security.⁵ After the start of broader cultural and institutional contacts in 1881, a group of cultural intermediaries arose. It consisted of two elements: senior Korean officials (Kim Okkyun; Pak Yönghyo, 1861–1939; and others) who frequented Japan on diplomatic occasions, developed a large network of Japanese acquaintances and supporters and generally were willing to accelerate Korean reforms forcefully along Meiji lines; and some students, who came to Japanese institutes of higher learning for much longer periods to obtain the secrets of Japan’s wealth and power in practical details. While the first group was soon decimated by the failure of the Japan-supported Kapsin coup, some key members of the early Korean student community in Japan—Yun Ch’iho (1865–1945, studied at the Keiō Gijyuku and

Dojinsha schools in 1881–3), Yu Kiljun (1856–1914, studied at Keiō in 1881–2), Yu Sōngjun (Yu Kiljun's younger brother, 1860–1935, studied at Keiō in 1883–4), Hyōn Yōngun (1868–?, studied at Keiō at 1883–5), Sō Chaep'il (1863–1951, studied at Toyama Military School in 1883–4), An Kyōngsu (1853–1900, studied textile production in Okayama Prefecture in 1883–4) and others⁶—soon rose to positions of leadership in Korea's modernisation efforts. Most of them were forced to keep a low profile during the decade of Chinese hegemony in Korean politics (1884–94), but as soon as the Japanese ousted the Chinese influence from Seoul at the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the summer of 1894, the modernisers with Japanese experience were suddenly brought to the forefront. The State Deliberative Council (*Kun'guk kimuch'ō*), launched on 25 July 1894 to become the main engine behind the 1894 (Kabo) reform drive, consisted mostly of the reformers, whose only exposure to modernity was to its Meiji version: according to Yu Yōngik's analysis, only three of thirteen key members of the 1894 reform faction had never been to Japan before, while the rest included three members of the 1881 Mission and three diplomats who had spent prolonged stints in Japan.⁷ Not surprisingly, their vision of modernised Korea—a Cabinet-centred strong central government with the King as a largely symbolic figure, streamlined and uniform local administration instead of a diversity of traditional administrative units, rudimentary local self-government, monetarisation of taxes, a Japanese-trained army and police, and abolition of the traditional class system—more or less followed Meiji lines. In correlation, the Japanese-installed cabinet was often obliged, unlike its Meiji loyalist prototype, to compromise its ideal of national independence and reluctantly rely on foreign (that is, Japanese) money and troops.⁸

The downfall of the pro-Japanese administration that came after the Triple Intervention (23 April 1895), the barbaric slaying of Queen Min (20 August 1895), and, finally, King Kojong's historic flight to the Russian Legation (11 February 1896) did not bring any cardinal changes to the dominant position that Meiji ideals and inspirations—in the broad sense of the word—had already occupied in the mind of Korea's radical reformers. Court diplomacy in the late 1890s vacillated between Russia and Japan in an attempt to secure as much room as possible for the realisation of Kojong's sovereign rights.⁹ By contrast, the main organisation representing Korea's fledgling modern civil society, the Independence Club (*Tongnip Hyōphoe*, July 1896–December 1898), headed by, among others, the Japan-educated An Kyōngsu (who held the chairmanship before March 1898) and then Yun Ch'ihō (chairman after March 1898), undoubtedly favoured Japan much more strongly, especially after that country's highly successful and popular campaign against Russia's concession demands had begun in earnest in late February 1898. Japan's elder statesman, Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) was given a famously lavish reception by the Independence Club leadership while on a private tour in Korea in August 1898, and was praised by the then Club's chairman, Yun Ch'ihō, and its judicial commissioner (*sabōp wiwōn*),

Chŏng Kyo (1856–1925), as “the hero of Europe and Asia”.¹⁰ A steady stream of Korean students, state-sponsored and private, began to flow to Japan with renewed strength from 1895—approximately 160 arrived in 1897 alone, 64 of them on Korean government stipends.¹¹ As, according to new regulations for recruitment to official posts (*Chup’animgwan sihŏm kŭp immyŏng kyuch’ik*) announced in December 1898, graduates of Japanese and other foreign institutions of higher learning were given the prerogative of being appointed to such posts after passing a simplified examination, younger officials with a Japanese educational background by the end of the 1900s constituted a small (7.5 per cent of all officials), but very vocal and energetic group among Korea’s bureaucrats. Before 1904, they were mostly employed in lower- and middle-ranking, often technical, posts, but many of them were promptly promoted to positions of responsibility and control following the establishment of Japan’s protectorate over Korea on 17 November 1904.¹² By way of comparison, only 64 Koreans studied in the United States between 1882 and 1905 (many of them went to Japan for study first, and embarked on their American journeys from there),¹³ and only a few of them (Yun Ch’iho, Pak Hŭibyŏng, Yŏ Pyŏnghyŏn and several others) acquired any prominence in officialdom, civil society and/or the modern media before 1910.¹⁴ The number of those heading for Russia or France for study was negligible.

Japanese influence continued to dominate Korea’s emerging modern bureaucratic and civil society into the early 1900s as well. So far as Kojong’s diplomacy was concerned, it aimed at manoeuvring and balancing between Russia and Japan, and between pro-Japanese and pro-Russians factions at court. Attempted subversion by the *émigré* groups in Japan (Pak Yŏngghyo’s bid to use Hwalbindang rebels in 1900 and Yu Kiljun’s attempted *coup d’état* in 1902) were subjects of the utmost anxiety, and Korea’s permanent neutralisation with US help and under great power guarantees emerged as the most important political objective.¹⁵ But in the realm of wealth accumulation and knowledge production, Japan’s supremacy was undisputed. In 1901–05, it absorbed between 87 per cent (1901) and 78 per cent (1905) of Korea’s exports and provided it with 60–70 per cent of all its imports, thus claiming the largest share of Korea’s growing foreign trade.¹⁶ The sudden deficit of available Japanese coins triggered by Japan’s switch to the gold standard and the withdrawal of the silver currency in 1897, occasional violent behaviour on the part of Japanese merchants in Korea, and Japan’s blunt demands to Korea to accept Dainichi Bank certificates as a common legal tender in 1902 provoked understandable anger among some sections of Korea’s emergent entrepreneurial class,¹⁷ yet Korean merchants were at the same time heavily dependent on their Japanese colleagues, who bought most of Korea’s exports, used many Korean entrepreneurs as intermediaries, and patronised Korea’s fledgling private banks—typically, the Taehan Ch’ŏnil Bank, founded in 1899.¹⁸ It is of little surprise that trade with Japan was generally viewed by the reformist intellectuals of that period as a factor greatly contributing to Korea’s prosperity.¹⁹ In the sphere

of knowledge production—where the relationship, known in Gramscian terms as *hegemony*, the ideological dominance “accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level”,²⁰ is usually negotiated and shaped—reliance on the models of modernity supplied by the Japanese Other was even more pronounced. Even among the early 1900s textbooks of civic ethics (*susin*)—the sphere that any nation-state has obvious reasons to keep independent from direct foreign influences—the textbooks by Japan’s Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), the famed nativist advocate of ‘Oriental values’²¹ occupied a prominent place as a model for ethics textbook-writing. And in the spheres where foreign knowledge was more desperately needed, Japanese books in translation, or Korean compilations based on Japanese works and/or Japanese-translated works of Western authors, were virtually dominant. A good example is supplied by *Miguk tongnip sa* (The History of American Independence, 1899), a book that played a crucial role in acquainting the intellectuals of the 1900s with the basics of American history and constitution. This was, in fact, a translation by Hyōn Ch’ae (1886–1925) of what appears to be Shiozawa Ichitarō’s digest of the influential work *Beikoku dokuritsu senshi* (History of the American Independence War, 1895) by Shibue Tamotsu (1857–1930).²² As a modern Euro-American system of knowledge was being introduced through the more easily comprehensible medium of Japanese, peppered with Chinese logographs perfectly recognisable for Korean intellectuals, Japan rapidly came to acquire the ideologically hegemonic position of the main purveyor of modernity in the Orient and the country Korea had to emulate once it wanted to enter the modern international system. In such an atmosphere, some radical Pan-Asianist projects of Korea’s high-speed development through massive injections of Japanese capital and technology emerged and gained public attention. For example, the Japanese-educated An Kyōngsu wrote a seminal treatise entitled *Samguk tongmaengnon* (‘On the union between three states’), which was posthumously serialised in a conservative Tokyo journal, *Nihonjin* (issues 116–123, 5 June to 20 September 1900). (An, a former chairman of the Independence Club, had been obliged to flee to Japan again in 1898 after his alleged plot to dethrone Kojong in favour of one of his princes was reported to have been revealed. He was executed in May 1900, after having returned voluntarily to Korea.) The union An proposed—considering it ultimately beneficial for Korea’s own interests—had to be based on Japanese-financed and Japanese-managed railroad construction and mining in Korea and Japanese-aided financial and military reforms in both Korea and China, and was to remake East Asia into a Japanese-led financial, political, economical and cultural block fully able to withstand the “White European aggression”.²³ This degree of Japanese-style Asianist radicalism was still somewhat exceptional for the Korean intellectuals of the early 1900s, but the modernising elite’s internalisation of the Asianist forms of Meiji hegemonic ideology was progressing speedily throughout the period between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.

Of course, the modernising elite’s fascination with Meiji patterns was hardly

shared by many among the underprivileged, who had to bear the brunt of the Japanese military's predations during the Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing suppression of the Tonghak peasant rebellion by the Japanese army, and who suffered from the constant rise in rice prices caused by the growing rice exports to Japan.²⁴ Colonel Karneev and Lieutenant-Colonel Alftan, who travelled throughout the country in the troubled times of 1895–6 as military agents of the Russian Chief of Staff, described vividly the “almost fanatical hatred of the Japanese by the ordinary people” and their willingness to join the Confucian-led anti-Japanese righteous armies (*ũbyõng*).²⁵ But the conflicting attitudes towards Japan were simply a part of the sharp, painful cleavages that emerged within Korean society as the weakened Korean monarchy was forcibly dragged into the capitalist world-system, and the new status of Korea as a peripheral supplier of agricultural products and mineral resources to Japan enriched only very few while impoverishing even more the already impoverished majority. The Confucian righteous army leaders, mostly local small- and middle-size gentry landowners, usually never had any chance to advance to a noticeable position in the corruption-ridden bureaucracy of the later 19th century. They were able to win a peasant following as the opponents of both the Japanese invaders and the Seoul oligarchs and scolded the reformist party, well represented among Seoul officialdom, as “corrupt careerists” and “Japanese stooges” at the same time.²⁶ The Japanese question, in a way, aggravated the pre-existing rupture between the nexuses of money and power in Seoul and its vicinities, and deepened the discontent of both local elites and impoverished masses in the provinces. Thorough alienation from the native society—the righteous armies in the provinces were often as merciless towards the reformists in European clothes as they were towards the Japanese traders²⁷—was one more factor strengthening the intellectual and political dependence of the radical reformers upon their Japanese counterparts. However, there were historical limits to the degree of cohesion between Korea's patriotically-minded admirers of Meiji progress and the Meiji state they so strove to emulate. The Japanese could be accepted as senior partners in commercial and intellectual exchanges, but as soon as they would attempt to put Korea under their political dominance, the core of the admired Meiji pattern—the preservation of political independence of the state—came under obvious threat. That is why Japan's thrust to colonise Korea eventually turned large groups of Pan-Asianist Japan-admirers into what is glorified in nationalist history-writing in both Koreas as independence fighters: although even at the point of violent struggle against the Japanese, the old enmity between modernising nationalists and righteous army Confucians was still, as a rule, not overcome.

The process of the political subjugation of Korea, initiated by the humiliating agreement with Japan that Kojong was forced to sign on 3 February 1904, at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, culminated on 17 November 1904, when Itō Hirobumi coerced the Korean cabinet into accepting the so-called Protectorate

Treaty, which made Korea into a Japanese possession in essence, if still not in form. These acts of naked aggression had the effect of sharply dividing the reformist groupings into a much-hated pro-Japanese wing, the middle-of-the-road majority who were still willing to hope that gradual progress would restore Korea's independence at some point, and radical nationalists, often Japan-oriented Pan-Asianists in the past, who felt cheated and betrayed.²⁸ The latter group, which eventually produced some of the leaders of the *émigré* independence movement of the 1910s and 1920s, is well represented by the figure of An Chunggŭn (1879–1910). A reformer who vocally supported Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) as “the defender of the yellow race against white predators”, in terms strikingly similar to An Kyŏngsu's Asianist ‘Unionist’ theories,²⁹ he came to perceive Japan's subsequent steps as “betrayal” and became a Korean nationalist hero by assassinating Itō Hirobumi, a national hero of Meiji Japan and the driving force in Korea's colonisation, on 26 October 1909. An Chunggŭn's complicated conglomerate of ideas (developed in the unfinished treatise on ‘peace in the Orient’ he was writing in prison before execution on 26 March 1910), with its nuanced combination of an uncompromising nationalist line (the assertion of Korea's sovereignty) and continuing belief in the “competition between white and yellow races” with the ultimate necessity of an equal alliance between Korea, Japan and China, shows very well the complicities of the Korean-Japanese modernisation dialogue.³⁰ A positive interest in Japan as the flagship of Asia's revival and the bulwark of its anti-Western defences, in combination with the record of heroically punishing Japan's hero of modernisation and imperialism, were all substantial elements in making An into a symbolic figure for Korea's modernising nationalism. Violent rejection of Japanese colonialist ambitions was one of the possible logical conclusions of enthusiastic adherence to the Meiji project of self-strengthening state nationalism.

Ideology for export: Meiji ideas in the context of Korean Enlightenment, 1905–10

The focus of this paper is on the perceptions of Japan in the Enlightenment publications of the later 1900s: such are leading early nationalist newspapers (*Taehan Maeil Sinbo* especially) and the journals of scholarly societies (*hakhoe*) (especially *Taehan Hakhoe Wŏlbo*, *Taehan Hŭnghakpo*, *Sŏu Hakhoe Wŏlbo* and *T'aegŭk Hakpo*), as well as pamphlets and brochures (such as Yi Sŭngman's famous *Tongnip Chŏngsin*). One object of analysis will be the dissimilar emphases put by the different Enlightenment activists who tended to view Meiji reforms as a success and a model for Korea's own transformation. Those less liberal, and politically more strongly pro-Japanese (such as Ch'oe Sŏkha), had a tendency to admire Japan's ‘patriotic education’ and the elements of Confucian moralism in the statist (*kokkashugi*) versions of Meiji ideology. In fact, elements of this ideology deeply impressed even the avowed liberals, especially those

of them who began their journeys into the world of modernity from Japan. As one example, Yu Kiljun, already mentioned above, one of the first Koreans ever to study in both Japan and the USA and a leader of the 1894–5 reform drive, in his 1907 *Nodong Yahak Tokpon* (Book of readings for working men’s evening schools) described the Korean state as the Meiji *kazoku kokka* or ‘family state’, likening it to the “house of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea inhabited by 20 millions of his grandsons, for whom the Imperial family is like their familial clan”³¹—and that despite his declared sympathies for Great Britain’s liberal and constitutionalist ideals.³² Common to most mainstream reformers in Yu Kiljun’s milieu was a keen interest in the ideas on “organic statehood” of J. K. Bluntschli (1808–81)—that is, an understanding of the state as a “juridical person”, in which both rulers and the ruled are inseparably bound by an “organic relationship” that is legal, “spiritual” and “historical” in character. Bluntschli himself, in such masterpieces as his encyclopaedic *Lehre vom modernen Staat* (three vols, 1875–6)³³, saw this theory as a sort of middle-of-the-road position between the “extremes” of Rousseau’s contractual visions of the state and uncompromising monarchism. His statist popularisers and commentators in East Asia, notably Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), emphasised the “organic” state’s “majestic dignity” (*statshoheit*), the cohesive “togetherness” (*die Zusammengehörigkeit*) of its citizenry, and the right of the former forcibly to impose sacrifices on the latter.³⁴ For example, Korea’s earliest modern textbook of law, compiled and published by Yu Sŏngjun (younger brother of Yu Kiljun) on the basis of Bluntschli-influenced Meiji legal texts, explicitly defined the state as an “organic entity” and its ruler as “the person who is customarily treated as a sacred and inviolable figure”.³⁵ Similar ideas—namely, the distinction between the historically formed *volk* (*inmin*), and the nation (*kungmin*) as both a legal and “organic” entity unified “as one individual” not only by a common “spirit” and “will” but also by a “shared awareness of its belonging to one state”—may be found in one of Korea’s earliest textbooks of politics, compiled by Na Chin (1881–1918) and Kim Sangyŏn (1874–?) with ample use of Bluntschli texts in Japanese translations as well.³⁶

However, the younger pro-Japanese reformers, influenced by the Asianist emphasis on the ‘Oriental spirit’, usually went much further in their sympathies towards the conservative statism of late Meiji times. This group believed that the introduction of a strong state-centred ideology comparable with the Meiji credo of *Yamato tamashii* (‘Japanese spirit’) would be the only way to push Korea into self-strengthening along the already well-chartered Japanese road. For example, Ch’oe Sŏkha, writing in the *T’aegŭk Hakpo* (the mouthpiece of the T’aegŭk Academic Society formed by Korean students in Japan in September 1905) argued in an article entitled ‘Chosŏn hon’ (‘Korean spirit’, in *T’aegŭk Hakpo*, issue 5, December 1906) that Koreans should develop and articulate their own version of *Yamato tamashii* to survive on the international Darwinian battlefield:

To regard one's life just as a bit of straw that can be always sacrificed for the state's sake following *bushido's* canons—that is what Japanese spirit is about! ... If the Japanese would not have had their Japanese spirit, how could that small East Asian state have obtained the position it has today? ... Of course, it would be a mistake to say that Koreans don't possess Korean spirit entirely ... Consider: doesn't our Korea have the independent and proud history of 4300 years? Once there is a state, its spirit does not disappear even for a moment, and had not such spirit existed for 4300 years, how could this country preserve its independence? ... Alas, possessing such a heroic spirit, for what reasons do we stand now where we stand? ... The problem is that our Korea has suffered from incessant external invasions and internal discord for more than a century, its politics being emasculated by literary weakness [*munyak*], its morals having degenerated to a simple formality, and education having stopped at literary exercises. That is why our state's spirit decayed ... and people cannot witness its glory ... But, if our compatriots will develop and foster our Korean spirit, we can recover political, economic and international rights we have lost!³⁷

While Ch'oe evidently defined the “spirit of state” (*kukhon*) as a universal, rather than specifically Japanese or Asian concept (the “spirits” of the US, Russia and France are mentioned as well), the context shows that Meiji experience in its “developing and fostering” was serving as an obvious point of reference. That “developing and fostering” of the Japanese “spirit” led the “small East Asian state” into perpetrating exactly the sort of “invasions” Korea was evidently “suffering” from, did not stop Ch'oe from praising Japanese ways: he obviously did not regard imperialism as an evil in itself. In his programme article for the first issue of *T'aegŭk Hakpo* (August 1906), entitled ‘Kukka ron’ (‘On the theory of statehood’), he boldly stated:

As today's 20th century is an epoch of the struggle for survival when only the fittest survives and the weak are devoured by the strong in accordance with Nature's laws, all the civilised powers, pressured by the growth of their populace and shortage of land, are forced, because of the limitations of their internal natural resources, to colonise overseas territories in order to guarantee the well-being of their citizens. That is what is called imperialism.³⁸

Evidently, imperialism was understood as a necessary social extension of natural laws and an indispensable feature of “modern”, “civilised” statehood. Japanese imperialism, following this logic, was to be carefully studied and, whenever possible, reproduced in Korean experience, rather than be denounced; and Korea's misfortune was not the era of imperialism in itself, but the country's inability successfully to develop its own imperialism, mostly ascribed to the legacy of “literary weakness”. But, Korean imperialism on the scale of Western ones being obviously rather a theoretical possibility than a practical solution, what should the country do in the era when “the strong” were “devouring the weak”? As Ch'oe Sŏkha's group was leaning towards racist variations of Pan-Asianism, to rely on racially close Japan

for protection and guidance was a logical solution. Ch'oe and the like-minded pro-Japanese progressives considered it also fully viable, in view of Japan's military triumph over Russia in 1904–05, seen as a victory of the whole yellow race. For example, a student publishing under the pseudonym of P'ousaeng ('One embracing the universe') gave the following definition to the Russo-Japanese War in the article with a tellingly Darwinist title, 'Kyöngjaeng ũi Künbon' ('The basics of competition', *T'aegük Hakpo*, issue 22, June 1908):

Up to the present, there were two main different currents in the activities of humanity, each clearly discernible from the other: one was the Western stream of expansion, and the other was the Eastern one. Before, they had had almost no opportunities to meet each other, but in the 19th century their interaction became more frequent, and in the 20th century their mutual competition is becoming increasingly intense and fierce. That is what events like the Japanese-Russian war express. On the one side, there were voices warning about the 'yellow peril', and on the other side there were voices warning about the 'white peril'. That means that in future, history will witness an inescapable all-out struggle between the yellows and the whites, and even today, the most urgent international issue is that of interracial competition. Under such circumstances, the members of the same race usually tend to protect and help each other, while simultaneously rejecting the advances of the alien races—that is what catches our sight today.

But, while evidently viewing the Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry as a part of the global interracial struggle, where Korea's place was supposed to be on the yellow side, P'ousaeng did not seem to regard Japanese intentions as exclusively benign: he finished his article by telling readers that "the question is also whether there are no yellows possessing what we consider 'white' characteristics".³⁹ What he wished to allude to was, in fact, quite clear: predatory whites had been a subject for Korean journalism for a long time already, and hinting at the 'white characteristics' of the Japanese was intended to emphasise that their protection and help towards Korean racial brethren could be also a mixed blessing.

That an article, which generally followed the theses of Japanese Social-Darwinist Pan-Asianist thought, also contained certain elements of doubt towards Japanese *Realpolitik*, is not surprising. In the 1900s, at the early stage of formation of Korea's still pre-colonial nationalism, ideological and political boundaries between the various camps did not necessarily match: even those opposing Japan's political designs on the ground could still in theory agree with racialist taxonomies and racialised Social-Darwinist views originating in Japan. For example, *Hwangsöng Sinmun* (5 September 1898–30 August 1910), commonly known as a moderately anti-Japanese mouthpiece of nationalist reformist Confucians, published an editorial entitled 'Injong ũi kwang'gye' ('Racial relationships, 15 January 1910) in which it contrasted "Occidentals, who are thoroughly imbued with the ideals of racial solidarity and awareness of interracial struggle for survival" and "Orientals, who just pay lip service to the cause of racial

cooperation”, and also predicted a “great racial war” between yellows and whites, where only an enhanced spirit of “racial love” might help the former to win over the otherwise stronger competitors.⁴⁰ Moreover, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (18 July 1904–28 August 1910), which earned a reputation for vociferous anti-Japanism, also published some articles pointing to the supposedly “brighter” sides of Japan’s “protection” over the country. For example, its series of articles on Japanese influence on Korean affairs, published between 2–7 September 1904 (and available also in English in the newspaper’s English version, the *Korea Daily News*), concluded, after listing numerous instances of Japanese “arrogance” and “overbearing behaviour” in the country, that, to a certain degree, Japanese “excesses” were caused by the Koreans’ own “corruption” and ineffective ways of government; and, after all, Japan, which itself just recently entered the “civilised world”, could be “the best teacher” for Korea’s “progress”.⁴¹ Not only a racialised vision of the world, but also a positive interest towards the Meiji model of speeded-up, “compressed” development seemingly transcended the moving, inconsistent boundaries between the different political camps.

Of course, differences in political and social persuasions accounted also for a dissimilar, sometimes mutually contradictory understanding of what actually should be learned from the Japanese ‘teachers’. For example, Yun Hyojŏng (1858–1939), no less sympathetic to Japan than Ch’oe Sŏkha but somewhat more liberally inclined and more keenly interested in constitutionalist ideas, preferred to view Meiji success as a “triumph for constitutionalism and people’s rights” rather than just a “victory of bushido-based patriotism”, emphasising the role of popular empowerment and representation for the social cohesion and ultimate Darwinist “survival of the nation”. With a somewhat different political emphasis, but still in similar vein, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*, the staunchest opponent of Japan’s policy of accelerating Japanese migration to Korea, nonetheless, in an editorial of 22 April 1910 (‘Hanirin chach’iryŏk ū pigyo’—‘Comparison between the Korean and Japanese abilities for self-rule’) praised the Japanese residents of Korea for their ability “to raise the flag of their associations wherever they come to live” and for their penchant for “building schools, hospitals, and other public facilities through public efforts”. As both Korea and Japan entered an age of competition, Koreans had to advance “exactly as much as the other side” in order to ensure their survival, the newspaper admonished, while talking very pessimistically about Korea’s “dilapidated old systems of self-rule” and conspicuous absence of any new ones.⁴² In these cases, modern Japan was seen in the light preferred by Japan’s own liberals, as the only Eastern country that had succeeded in harnessing the energies of popular political and social participation in the service of the state’s survival and progress.

As already seen, views emphasising the role of patriotic ideologies, education and popular mobilisation in Japan’s success and those advocating adoption of similar ideological practices in Korea as a prerequisite for the country’s survival,

were popular not only among Japan's political allies, but on the other side of an increasingly hardening political divide as well, among those refusing to compromise with Japan's growing presence in Korea. As a typical reformist Confucian (who became afterwards one of the most prominent nationalist leaders in exile), Pak Ŭnsik represented this tendency. Pak used to express his admiration for Japan's bushido spirit and patriotic courage and wanted his compatriots to learn from them. In an editorial article in *Sŏu Hakhoe Wŏlbo* (issue 10, September 1907), entitled 'Munyak chi p'ye p'ilsang ki guk' ('Those affected by literary weakness necessarily lose their states'), he forcefully argued for the advantages of making a war-like (*sangmu*) spirit into the foundation of state ideology:

War-like states ... are strong and powerful enough not to allow others to infringe upon them. By contrast, those ruled by the literati are always passive, as if they are sleeping or terminally ill. Almost every muscle in their bodies is atrophied, and the body of state as a whole is too corrupt to be able to fence off attacks by outsiders.

After describing in the strongest possible tone the dilapidated state of the military in literati-ruled Korea, Pak took Japan as an example of what a really war-like state could achieve:

Let us look now at Japan's most recent history. From the time of the Kamakura shogunate that existed more than 700 years ago, Japan developed at state level its war-like spirit called bushido, and that is why the Japanese are characterised by bravery. That is why, in the past thirty years, with the development of education, the Japanese have advanced in patriotism and the collectivist spirit much more than any other country. As a result, they were able to defeat China and throw back Russia, enhanced greatly their national prestige and joined the ranks of great European and American powers. Oh, how great the effect of war-like spirit is!⁴³

Famous for his bold editorial in *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* (20 November 1905) protesting against the Protectorate Treaty forced by Japan, Chang Chiyŏn (1864–1920), another prominent reformist Confucian, considered Japanese-style patriotism a necessary check-and-balance mechanism for any country venturing into the uncharted waters of party politics. Writing in *Taehan Chaganghwe Wŏlbo* (issue 5, November 1906) in an editorial entitled 'Tanch'e yŏnhu minjok kabo' ('Only if the collective exists can the nation be preserved'), Chang deplored the Korean "predilection towards selfish factional struggle" and chose Japanese parliamentary politics as an example of how patriotism could lead party politicians to "transcend" their differences and "selflessly serve the country":

In Japan, the *Jiyūtō* [Liberal Party] and *Shimpotō* [Progressive Party] initially confronted each other, for each had dissimilar opinions. But after the dissolution of [purely] *hanbatsu* [oligarchic cliques]-based government, the two parties began to cooperate in the Diet.

On one side, they once allied their forces into the *Kenseitō* [Constitutional Party]; on the other head, their [former members] continued to oppose each other. All this was done out of disinterested patriotism! Is party struggle possible in a state, if not in such a form? Oh, how pitiful it is that this wisdom does not reach us!⁴⁴

Constitutionalism and party politics were popularly viewed as the cornerstones for Meiji success among Western-oriented and Christian converts politically opposed to Japan: typically, Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman: 1875–1965) praised the “democratic achievements” of the Meiji emperor. On the other hand, more conservative reformist Confucians were, as we have been able to see, more interested in learning how to check ideologically what they perceived as a destructive side of parliamentary rivalries. It is important to point out that their political opposition to Japan’s designs against Korea’s independence did not prevent Pak Ŭnsik, Chang Chiyŏn or Yi Sŭngman from looking towards Japan for various kinds of modernising experience, institutional and ideological. While their politics in the 1900s were distinctively anti-Japanese, their discourse of modernity and civilisation doubtlessly used Meiji experience as one of the main reference frames. However much they could be opposed to Ch’oe Sŏkha or Yun Hyojŏng’s political line, their discursive affinity allowed them to collaborate with those overtly pro-Japanese figures while working together in *Taehan Chaganghoe* (Korea Self-Strengthening Society, April 1906–August 1907) and *Taehan Hyŏphoe* (Korea Association, November 1907–August 1910).

However, even though they were generally influenced in varying degrees by racist Pan-Asianist ideas, both those politically opposed to the Japanese and those willing to accept the Protectorate’s phraseology at its face value largely agreed that, although Japan could provide a good example to Korea through cultural and/or racial proximity, its civilisation was still very much a second-hand product. Even those strongly favouring pro-Japanese Pan-Asianist ideas—not to mention Japan’s political opponents—still tended to perceive Western countries as somewhat superior to Japan’s secondary civilisation. At its best, Japan was perceived as simply one of the civilised countries. For example, one of *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*’s early editorials on enlightenment, entitled ‘Sisa mundap’ (‘Dialogue on current affairs’, 27 September 1898), explained to its readers that those countries employing cruel punishment should not be called enlightened and generally did not last for too long. After mentioning the swift downfall of the “cruel Qin” (221–206 BC) and the longevity of the more “humane” Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220) in China, it shifted to more recent examples:

In today’s world, the Later Roman Empire [*sic*, V.T.], Turkey, Mexico, Spain and China are states that enjoy inflicting cruel punishments. They are either falling down, or are weak and decaying. But in Britain, America, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, the punishments are not cruel, and that is why these states are advancing forward daily ... And how can our country today be compared with the civilised lands?⁴⁵

Japan was not praised *per se*, but just taken as one example of the worthiness of civilisation. In the same way, in some cases Japan's trademark patriotic spirit was seen not as Japan's own particular feature, but as an important element of civilisation, which Japan managed to acquire on the same level as all the other civilised powers—but not in a much higher degree. For example, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* editorialised on 28 June 1910 on 'Patriots' ideas' ('Aegukcha üi sasang') in the following way:

The people of the foreign powers begin to recite patriotic verses as soon as they enter school, grow while hearing patriotic stories and anecdotes, with the fathers admonishing their sons in the truths of patriotism, and with brothers offering patriotic advice to each other. The people there sport patriotic badges on their clothes, use the word 'patriotic' even in naming recreational associations, call their drinks 'patriotic vines' and their keepsakes 'patriotic souvenirs'. They bow to the directions of their kings' palaces even during their merry-makings ... That is why French female entertainers, even pressed, used to refuse to escort the Germans, and that is why Japanese children used to refuse to take cookies as gifts from the Russians.⁴⁶

Opinions in Korea generally converged on the point that Japan had achieved a certain measure of success in civilising itself through the acquisition of power and wealth, but its position was not seen as something too high and advanced for Korea to emulate. On the question of whether Korea's successful adoption of civilisation could make it Japan's equal partner, a certain optimism existed even in 1906–07, when the protectorate regime was already in full force. For example, Hwang Ünyong, then a student in the USA, sent a letter, reprinted in *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* on 20 October 1906, to the San Francisco-based *Kongnip Sinbo* (established on 12 November 1905 by Korean immigrants), in which he discussed Korea's future and concluded:

Oh, how great and laudable is the acquisition of wealth, power and independence by a state! And how deplorable the state today of [our] collective strength! Today's Korea looks like the America of a century ago. But, if our compatriots would unite their minds in the collectivist spirit, we could overcome Japan's strength and achieve wealth, power and independence. But, if the government bureaucrats continue, as before, to struggle among themselves day and night for power and influence and trade openly in official appointments, and the people will not reform their selfish, egoistical, jealous minds full of evil intentions towards their neighbours, we will not avoid ruining our state and becoming Japanese slaves.⁴⁷

Japan's position was evidently not seen as one totally beyond Korea's reach: efforts in the right direction could secure Korea the wherewithal to fend off Japan's imperialistic demands. This belief was even stronger among reformist Confucians, more accustomed to thinking of the 'island barbarians' in condescending terms. Yi Ki (1848–1909), for example, maintained that Japan, however strong its army might grow, would never obtain hegemony in East Asia because of its inability to secure

foreign good will through acts of “benevolence” and “sincerity”.⁴⁸ For the Christian converts—for example, the prominent Christian intellectual An Kuksŏn (1879–1926), An Kyŏngsu’s adopted son, who studied in Japan in 1895–9 and is credited with introducing the basics of Western political studies, mostly via Japanese translations, to Korea in the late 1900s—the failure of the Japanese ruling class to convert to Christianity *en masse* was evidence that Japan progressed “only materially, but not yet spiritually” towards Western ideals.⁴⁹ It was not only the supposed lack of traditional or Christian virtues that was considered a crucial shortcoming in Japan’s drive towards civilisation and enlightenment: Korea’s reformist Confucians also followed the lead of Liang Qichao (1873–1929) in also claiming that Japan was far from reaching the top position in introducing Western social and political institutions. An article by Liang entitled ‘Spenser speaks on the Japanese Constitution’ dealt with the famous advice by Herbert Spencer to Mori Arinori (1847–89) not to rush forwards with constitutional reforms in Japan because of the “low civilisational level” of the Japanese people (who were said just “to be standing near the foundation of the glorious tower of progress, still unable to climb up too high”). The article was reprinted in its entirety in the first issue of *Taehan Hyŏphwe Hoebo* (April 1908) and was well known to Korea’s progressive Confucian intellectuals.⁵⁰ Some of them contributed in various journals their own critical appraisals of Japan’s civilisational standing. For example, on the eve of Japan’s final annexation of Korea, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* published an indignant pro-independence editorial entitled ‘To the Japanese’ (‘Ilbonin ege’, 28 December 1909), which clearly stated that “Japan, which traditionally was backward in comparison with us, has just outstripped us recently in acceptance of the new civilisation—something that we can do as well with no less success provided we are given time.” The relationship between Japan and Korea, the editorial maintained, was to be compared with that between Turkey and Greece, or Sweden and Norway, and not with the position European states had towards their African or Pacific colonies. The editorial concluded prophetically that Japan, “a small East Asian island”, should understand that bigger and stronger European and American rivals would inevitably check its continental expansion.⁵¹

Dilemmas of race, state and nation: the ambiguities of a modernisation dialogue

As we have seen, Japan’s modernity, being unmistakably a key reference point for the whole of Korea’s modernising elite (often led by Japanese-educated modernisers), also provided the conceptual space for many of Korea’s early debates on modernity. Various features of Japanese modernity were hotly contested, and the features of Korea’s own modern project gradually became clearer in the process of such an

ideological contest. In some of the discussions, political affiliation determined ideological position: for example, Japan-inclined adepts (Ch'oe Sökha and others) of the Pan-Asianist, anti-white theory of race preservation (*pojong*) were strongly censured by increasingly anti-Japanese reformers of the Sin Ch'aeho type, who prioritised nation or state preservation (*pjok, poguk*). Both views were thoroughly grounded in Social Darwinist logic, but while the first led to the acceptance of Japanese rule, the second grew afterwards into one of the ideologies of the anti-Japanese independence movement. In the same way, An Kyöngsu's and An Chunggün's views on regional and racial cooperation, while differing principally in their political implications, were both solidly grounded in rather similar Asianist beliefs in the inescapability of interracial competition and the consequent imperative of intra-racial cooperation. The fracture between the *political* and the *discursive* components in attitudes on Japan was prominent in many cases of the middle-of-the-road modernisers, who, while negative in principle about Japan's colonialist politics, found it either impossible or undesirable to actively resist them. Yu Kiljun, for example, considered the Meiji *kazoku kokka* model of the 'family state' a practical model for Korea, but was simultaneously repentant about relying on Japan's protection and loans during the 1894–5 reform drive and negative about Korea's gradual loss of sovereignty. In the situation where the Meiji project dominated Korea's progressives *ideologically* while being intensely contested in its concrete *political* implications, the ideological boundaries did not necessarily match the political ones. Ch'oe Sökha's rhetoric of "sacred state" and the "absolute priority of patriotic duties over private life" found its way on to the pages of the consistently anti-Japanese *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* and was a distinctive feature of Sin Ch'aeho's fiercely anti-Japanese editorials. Such a prominent feature of Japan's contemporary view of modernity as the racialist contrasting of yellows and whites was also ostensibly present in the minds and speeches of some *politically* anti-Japanese personages. One good example is Yun Ch'ihö, *politically* opposed to Japan's infringement upon Korea's independence in the 1900s. Nevertheless, on hearing the news of Russia's complete defeat in the landmark Tsushima sea battle (27 May 1905), he wrote in his English diary (entry for 2 June 1905):

What a glorious campaign this has been to Japan! As a Korean, I have no special reasons for rejoicing over the uninterrupted successes of Japan. Every victory is a nail in the coffin of the Korean independence ... Yet as a member of the Yellow Race, Korea—or rather I—feel proud of the glorious successes of Japan. She has vindicated the honour of our race ... The Japanese have compelled the proud West to acknowledge the military and naval genius of the Far East.⁵²

Hardly any other phrase from any of the contemporary Korean sources shows better the deeply contradictory nature of the perceptions of Japan by the 1900s Enlightenment elite in Korea.

Editor's note: With the exception of the excerpt from Yun Ch'ih'o's English diary, all quoted passages, including that from the *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*, have been translated from the original Korean by the author and have been edited where necessary.

Notes

1. A thoughtful analysis of the process of implanting Meiji structures in Korea, as well as the formation of anti-Japanese nationalism on the base of the traditional Confucian pejorative view of Japan, can be found in Kwŏn T'aeŏk 2000:115–140.
2. See, for example, the relatively positive characterisation of Kim Okkyun's 'revolutionary attempt' given by Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), Korea's famed early nationalist scholar and second president (1925) of the Shanghai Provisional Government, in his seminal account, *Hanguk t'ongsa (Painful History of Korea: 1915)*. See *Hanguk t'ongsa* (translated into modern Korean by Kim Tohyŏng) 1997: 80–81. Pak Ŭnsik, however, also voiced his disapproval of Kim Okkyun's "reliance on outside forces".
3. Han'guk yŏksa yŏn'guhoe pukhan sahaksa yŏn'guban (ed.), 2003. *Pukhan ŭi yŏksa mandŭlgi*:68.
4. See, for example, the article by Kang Chaeŏn entitled 'Kaehwa sasang, kaehwap'a, Kansin chŏngbyŏn' (originally published in Japanese in 1968), published 1982 in *Han'guk kŭndaesa yŏn'gu*, Seoul: Hanbat ch'ulp'ansa:59–133. South Korean left-wing nationalist historian Kim Yŏngjak, who initially published his groundbreaking study of early modern Korean nationalism in Japanese in Tokyo in 1975, declared that he subscribed to Pak Ŭnsik's view of Kim Okkyun's movement. See Kim Yŏngjak, 1989. *Hanmal naesyŏnŏlijŭm yŏn'gu*. Seoul: Ch'ŏnggye:175.
5. Hŏ Tonghyŏn 2000.
6. Yi Kwangnin, 1986. 'Kaehwa ch'ogi han'gugin ŭi Ilbon yuhak', in *Han'guk kaehwa sa ŭi chemunje*:39–64.
7. Yu Yŏngik (Lew Young-ick), 1990. *Kabo kyŏngjang yŏn'gu* [Kabo reforms]. Seoul: Ilchogak:186–7.
8. *ibid*:178–224.
9. Hyŏn Kwangho 2002:40–47.
10. Chŏng Kyo, 2004. *Taehan kyenyŏnsa*, vol. 3:123–4.
11. See the statistics compiled by Korean students in Japan, later published in the article entitled 'Ilbon yuhaksaeng sa' in issue 6 of the student journal *Hakchigwang* (July 1915), and cited in Kim Kiju 1993:22–3. See also the statistics on the governmental dispatch of state-supported students cited in Kim Yŏngmo 1972:166–7. At the same time, Tsuboe Senji, in his *Chŏsen minzoku dokuritsu undŏ hishi* (Tokyo: Kōrai shorin, 1986:46), refers to only 155 known cases of Koreans studying in Japan in 1897. These and other discrepancies in the statistics concerning the numbers of Koreans who studied in Japan are largely caused by the difficulties in tracking down all cases of self-financed study, including the short-term ones. At the same time, the statistics on the governmental dispatch of students are relatively

- reliable, and show that around 30–40 students were sent for state-sponsored study to Japan every year. See Pak Inhwa, 1982. ‘Kuhanmal toil kwanbi yuhaksaeng e kwanhan Koch'al’ [Study of the Korean government-financed students in Japan in the Korean empire period], in Yihwa yōja taehakkyo, Sabōm taehak sahow saenghwalkwa (eds), *Nogu yōn'gu nonjip*, 24:89–91.
12. Kim Yōngmo 1972:169–81.
 13. Warren Y. Kim 1971:23.
 14. Hō Tonghyōn 2004:39–63.
 15. Hyōn Kwangho 2002: 46–126.
 16. *Tōkanfu tōkei nenpo*, Chōsen Tōkanfu, 1910:401.
 17. Kim Yunhūi 2003:7–36.
 18. Kim Yunhūi 2001:88–117. See also Kim Yunhee (Kim Yunhūi), 2003. ‘Credit transactions and co-dependence strategy adopted by three countries’ merchants in the foreign settlements of Seoul and Inch’ōn (1897–1905)’, (*International Journal of Korean History*, vol. 4:167–216), on the symbiotic relationship between Korean and Japanese traders, which included, among other points, a well-developed system of deferred payment and credit transactions.
 19. An Pyōngjik (ed.), 2001:190–95.
 20. Stuart Hall, 1982. ‘The rediscovery of ideology: return of the repressed in media studies’, in M. Gurevitch *et al.*, *Culture, Society, and the Media*. London: Methuen:95.
 21. Inoue Tetsujirō, Takayama Chogyū, 1898. *Rinri kyōkasho: shinpen*, vols 1–2. Tokyo: Kinkōdō shoseki; Inoue Tetsujirō, Ōshima Gishū, 1903. *Chūgaku shūshin kyōkasho*, vols 1–3. Tokyo: Bungakusha.
 22. Kim Ponghūi 1999:134–7, 200–208.
 23. Song Kyōngwōn 1997:201–75.
 24. On the early stages of the formation of modern Japanophobia among Korean plebeians, see Park Eunsook (Pak Ŭnsuk) 2003:53–85.
 25. Tyagai, G.D. (ed.), 1958. *Po Korea: Puteshestviya, 1885–1896*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury:134–265.
 26. Although there were certain exceptions, in general even those who had once had the comparatively low post of *ch'ambong* (9th grade lower class) were a rarity among righteous army leaders: for example, 68 per cent of the *ūibyōng* chieftains of T'aecin county (North Chōlla province) in 1906 were never in government service at all. See Pak Sōngsu, 1990. ‘Hanmal ūibyōngjang ūi sahowjōk paegyōng’:159–189.
 27. See, for example, the righteous army leaders’ declarations in *Han'guk tongnip undong sa charyo*, vol. 19 (*ūibyōngp'yōn* 12), Kwach'ōn: Kuksa p'yōnch'an wiwōnhoe, 1988:566–7.
 28. Pak Ch'ansūng 1990:81–140.
 29. An Chunggūn lamented, even after his shift to an anti-Japanese position after 1904, that Japan had not wrested “the whole of Manchuria up to Vladivostok to the North” from the influence of “Russia’s white race”, and, in his anti-white outrage, accused even US President Theodore Roosevelt of being unfair, “as a white person”, towards Japan’s claims during the

- US-sponsored negotiations that eventually led to the Portsmouth Treaty between Russian and Japan (5 September 1905)—otherwise, why hadn't Japan received a contribution from Russia? "If Russia's white race had been the victor, wouldn't Mr. Roosevelt have made much more effort to get a contribution from the defeated yellow race country, Japan?" An asked. See 'An Chunggŭn ūi *Tongyang p'yŏnghwa ron*', in Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003:93–119. Even after having "betrayed" its "yellow Korean brethren" and forcing Korea under its "Protectorate", Japan remained for An Chunggŭn a less malicious neighbour than "Russia's white race".
30. On An's Pan-Asianist views, and Japanese influences on Korean Pan-Asianism in general, see Yi Kwangnin 1989:138–55.
 31. *Yu Kiljun chŏnsŏ*, 1971, vol. 2:319–20.
 32. On Yu Kiljun's idealisation of British constitutionalism, see Kim Hakchun 2000:64–83.
 33. See the English translation: *The Theory of the State*, 1898. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 34. See Ishida Takeshi 1976:174–6. On Liang Qichao particularly, see U Namsuk 2000: 113–45.
 35. *Pŏphak t'ongnon*, 1905. Hansŏng (Seoul): Pangmunsa:74–5.
 36. *Kukkahak*, 1906. Seoul:7–13.
 37. *T'aegŭk Hakpo*, issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 13: 301–04.
 38. *Ibid*:18–19.
 39. *T'aegŭk Hakpo*, issues 21–26, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 16:109–110.
 40. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* (reprint), 1974, vol. 20:236.
 41. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 1:137.
 42. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6483.
 43. *Sŏu*, issues 10–17, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 6:6–9.
 44. *Taehan Chaganghwe Wŏlbo*, Issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 1:331.
 45. Cited in: Chŏng Sŏnt'ae, 1999:424.
 46. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6695.
 47. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 3:2395.
 48. See his 'Ilp'aeron' ('On Japan's defeat', 1904) in digitalised form, available as part of an on-line edition of Yi's collected works, *Haehak Yusŏ* (*kwŏn* 3): http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr/cgi-bin/ku/ku_ju_frame.cgi?id=F00001
 49. 'An Kuksŏn ūi saengae wa kyemong sasang', in Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003:140–200.
 50. *Taehan Hyŏphwe Hwebo*, issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 3:38–40.
 51. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6119.
 52. Kuksa p'ŏnch'an wiwŏnhwe (ed.), 1976. *Yun Ch'ihŏ Ilgi*, vol. 6:112–13.

Main sources and literature

- An Pyŏngjik (ed.), 2001. *Han'guk kyŏngje sŏngjang sa* [The history of Korean economic growth]. Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu
- Ch'oe Kiyŏng, 2003. *Han'guk kŭndae kyemong sasang yŏn'gu* [Korean modern enlightenment philosophy]. Seoul: Ilchogak
- Chŏng Kyo, 2004. *Taehan kyenyŏnsa* [History of the last days of the Korean empire], vols 1–10. Seoul: Somyŏng
- Chŏng Sŏnt'ae, 1999. *Kaehwagi sinmun nonsŏr-ŭi sŏsa suyong yangsang* [Reception of narrative models in newspaper editorials of the modern reform period]. Seoul: Somyŏng
- Han Ch'ŏrho, 1998. *Ch'inmi kaehwap'a yŏn'gu* [Studies on the pro-American reformist Group]. Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn
- Han'gukhak munhŏn yŏn'guso (ed.), 1976–1978. *Han'guk Kaehwagi haksulji* [Korean academic journals of the modern reform period], vols 1–21. Seoul: Asea munhwasa
- Han'guk yŏksa yŏn'guhoe pukhan sahaksa yŏn'guban (ed.), 2003. *Pukhan ŭi yŏksa mandŭlgi* [North Korea's history-making]. Seoul: P'urŭn yŏksa
- Hŏ Tonghyŏn, 2000. *Kŭndae hanil kwan'gyesa yŏn'gu* [Researches in the history of the modern Korean-Japanese relationship]. Seoul: Kukhak charyowŏn
- , 2004. 'Kaehwagi miguk yuhaksaeng kwa minjok undong' [Korean students in the USA in the modern reform period and the national movement], *Han'guk minjok undongsa yŏn'gu*, 38:39–63
- Hwangsŏng Sinmun (Imperial Capital Newspaper: reprint)*, vols 1–21, 1974. Seoul: Han'guk munhwa kanhaenghwe
- Hyŏn Kwangho, 2002. *Taehan cheguk ŭi taewoe chŏngch'aek* [Foreign policy of the Korean empire]. Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn
- Ishida Takeshi, 1976. *Nihon kindai shisŏshi ni okeru hŏ to seiji* [Law and politics in the modern Japanese history of ideas]. Tokyo: Iwanami
- Jaisohn, Philip, 1999. *My Days in Korea and Other Essays*. Seoul: Yonsei University
- Kim Hakchun, 2000. *Hanmal ŭi sŏyang chŏngch'ihak suyong yŏn'gu* [Research in the reception of Western political thought in the Korean empire period]. Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu,
- Kim Kiju, 1993. *Hanmal chaeil han'guk yuhaksaeng ŭi minjok undong* [Korean students' national movement in Japan in the Korean empire period]. Seoul: Nŭt'inamu
- Kim Ponghŭi, 1999. *Kaehwagi sŏjŏk munhwa yŏn'gu* [Research in the book [publishing] culture of the modern reform period]. Seoul, :Ihwa yŏja taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu
- Kim Tohyŏng, 1994. *Taehan chegukki-ŭi chŏngch'i sasang yŏn'gu* [Political thought in the Korean empire period]. Seoul: Chisik sanŏpsa
- Kim Yŏngmo, 1972. *Hanmal chibaech'ŭng yŏn'gu* [Researches in the ruling class of the Korean empire period]. Seoul: Han'guk munhwa yŏn'guso
- Kim Yunhŭi, 2001. '1899 nyŏn Taehan Ch'ŏnil Ŭnhaeng ŭi sŏllip paegyŏng kwa mokchŏk' [The

- background and aims of the establishment of the Taehan Ch'õnil Bank in 1899], *Kuksagwan nonch'ong*, 96:88–117
- , 2003. 'Samguk kongyõngnon ùi kyõngje palchõn pangan kwa kyõngin chiyõk taejabonka ùi kyõngjejõk chihyang' [Plans of the co-ordinated economic development for the Three [East Asian] States and the economic aims of the big capitalists of the Seoul-Inch'õn area], *Han'guk kũnhyõndae sa yõn'gu*, 26:7–36
- Kim, Warren Y., 1971. *Koreans in America*. Seoul: Po Chin Chai Printing Co.
- Kuksa p'õnch'an wiwõnhwe (ed.), 1973–1989. *Yun Ch'ihõ Ilgi* [Yun Chi'ho's diary], vols 1–11. Seoul: T'amgudang
- Kwõn T'aeõk, 2000. 'Kũndaehwa, tonghwa, singminji yusan' [Modernisation, assimilation and the colonial legacy], *Han'guksa yõn'gu*, 108:115–40
- Pak Ch'ansũng, 1990. 'Hanmal ùi chagang undongnon ùi kak kyeyõl kwa kũ sõngkyõk' [Different branches of the Self-strengthening Movement in the Korean empire period and their characters], *Han'guksa yõn'gu*, 68:81–140
- , 1992. *Han'guk kũndae chõngch'i sasangsa yõn'gu* [Research on the history of ideas in modern Korea]. Seoul: Yõksa pip'yõngsa
- Pak Sõngsu, 1990. 'Hanmal ùibyõngjang ùi sahowjõk paegyõng' [The social backgrounds of the 'righteous armies' commanders in the Korean empire period], in *Ilbon chegukchu'ui wa hanmal ùi sahoe pyõnhwa* [Japanese imperialism and social changes in the Korean empire period]. Sõngnam: Han'guk chõngsin munhwa yõn'guwõn:159–89
- Pak Ŭsik, 1997. *Hanguk t'ongsã* (Painful history of Korea: trans. into modern Korean by Kim Tohyõng). Taejon: Kyemyõng taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu
- Park Eunsook (Pak Ŭsuk), 2003. 'The minjung's perception of Japan during the period immediately following the Kanhwa Treaty (1876–1884), and their response to Japan', *International Journal of Korean History*, 5:53–85
- Song Kyõngwõn, 1997. 'Hanmal An Kyõngsu ùi chõngch'i hwaltong kwa taeoe insik' [An Kyõngsu's political activities and perceptions of foreign [countries] in the Korean empire period], *Han'guk sasang sahak*, 8:201–75
- Syngman Rhee (trans. by Han-Kyo Kim), 2001. *The Spirit of Independence*. Honolulu HI: University of Hawaii Press
- Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (*Korea Daily News*: reprint), vols 1–6, 1977. Seoul: Han'guk sinmun yõn'guso
- Tõkanfu tõkei nenpo* [Statistical Yearbook of the Residency-General]. 1910. Chõsen Tõkanfu
- U Namsuk, 2000. 'Han'guk kũndae kukkarõn ùi ironchõk wõnhyõng e kwanhan yõn'gu' [Study of the theoretical prototypes of modern Korean visions of statehood], *Han'guk chõngch'i oegyosa nonch'ong*, 22:113–45
- Yi Kwangnin, 1986. *Han'guk kaehwa sa ùi chemunje* [Various issues in the history of modern reforms in Korea]. Seoul: Ilchogak
- , 1989. *Kaehwap'a wa kaehwa sasang yõn'gu* [The reformist faction and its Ideas]. Seoul: Ilchogak
- Yu Kiljun chõnsõ* [Complete works by Yu Kiljun], vols 1–5, 1971. Seoul: Ilchogak